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I N recent years the parlous state of public order in the world com-munity has become an irresistible goad to creative energy by legal 
scholars. Unfortunately, the significance of many potentially valuable 
contributions to an improved order has been diluted by the tendency 
of writers to approach their thesis from the limited perspective of their 
own discipline as a more or less closed system, or to develop their 
views while suffering from what Harold Lasswell has referred to as 
the "syndrome of parochialism."! In an era characterized by intensive 
professional specialization and mounting chauvinism, the international 
lawyer who can surmount the parochialism of his own profession and 
his own cultural predispositions is a rarity indeed; the paragon who 
can do so consistently is even rarer. 
Yet the intricacies of disarray in the decentralized, horizontal sys-
tem of world public order2 will obviously not yield in any significant 
degree to the blandishments of positivistic rule manipulators-no 
matter how broadly international their perspectives may be-nor to 
recommendations constructed from the vantage point of the policy and 
value preferences of only a fraction of the participants in the global 
community. Proposals for bringing the world's legal order beyond 
its current state of near anarchy tend to be merely precatory unless they 
are firmly grounded in the realities of international life. Such realities 
include all the relevant features of the dynamic and complex decision-
1 Myres S. McDougal and Florentino P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public 
Order (New Haven 1961), xxi. 
2 For descriptions of the structure of legal organization in the world community, 
see Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, The Political Foundations of 
International Law (New York 1961), H)-29; Myres S. McDougal and Harold D. Lass-
well, "The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order," American 
Journal of International Law, LIII (January 1959), I; and Richard A. Falk, "Inter-
national Jurisdiction: Horizontal and Vertical Conceptions of Legal Order," Temple 
Law Quarterly, XXXII (Spring 1959), 295. 
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making processes in which such proposals are to be implemented, as 
well as the external and internal conditioning factors which influence 
decision-makers and other participants in those processes.3 
The two works under consideration in this article differ markedly 
in the extent to which they take account of these realities and in their 
methodology as well. C. Wilfred Jenks, in Law, Freedom and Wel-
fare, has collected a series of seven of his lectures and papers which 
proceed further along the lines of his earlier work, The Common 
Law of Mankind.4 Essentially, Jenks's approach is that of the ex-
perienced international lawyer working within the framework of legal 
positivism5 to increase respect for rules of international law and there-
by to encourage states which are members of the international com-
munity to submit their conduct to the application of those rules. He 
directs his scholarship to international lawyers and seeks to enlist 
their aid in promoting the growth of the scope of international law 
into areas of human concern such as freedom and welfare, which 
hitherto have been left largely in the domain of intrastate or regional 
competence. His aim is to encourage optimism (and "faith and 
creative vision") for this task by reporting the formidable advance-
ments made by international and regional organizations in prescrib-
ing new norms and recommending new standards in these areas, 
and to foster a climate of urgency by calling attention to the grand 
scale of the risks thrust upon all states by innovations of modern 
technology and to the desperate need for mastery of these newly 
perceived "laws of nature." 
Jenks attempts to create new bases for cooperative effort in the 
prescription and ultimate subjection of all states to new norms of in-
ternational conduct by locating an acceptable common morality-"the 
product of an enlightened self-interest"-by proving the existence of 
a new basis of legal obligation-"the will of the world community"-
by finding that "interdependence of states" has replaced independence 
as a basic concept of international law, and by calling for a universality 
3 Cf. McDougal and Lasswell, "Identification and Appraisal." 
4 London 1958. 
5 Critics of The Common Law of Mankind have referred to Jenks as a legal positivist 
who has regressed. They assert that he not only fails to consider law as operating 
within the context of its "social environment," but also has lagged behind those 
"progressive" positivists who study law as it is applied to concrete cases. See Richard 
A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz, "Some Criticisms of C. Wilfred Jenks' Approach 
to International Law," Rutgers Law Review, XIV (Fall 1959), I. This writer finds 
that the perceptive criticism of Jenks'S approach contained in the Rutgers article is 
equally applicable to Law, Freedom and Welfare. 
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of perspective which will encompass all the legal systems of the 
world in searching out "general principles of law." 
As an appeal to lawyers and jurists of the Austinian school and 
others of a cynical disposition to discard their debilitating view of 
international law as "not-law," Law, Freedom and Welfare is unex-
ceptionable, and indeed praiseworthy. As an antidote to pejorism 
in international relations it represents "the power of positive thinking" 
in its highest form. And many internationalists will join Jenks in his 
attack on parochialism. But insofar as this work purports to be "a 
positive programme of bold but practical action" (p. ix) to broaden the 
scope and applicability of the rule of law in international affairs,8 it 
tends to overlook a host of factors the consideration of which is es-
sential to its success. Jenks apparently eschews the policy-science ap-
proach to scholarship urged upon him by some of his earlier critics7 
which would have required him to consider in a systematic way all of 
the relevant configurations of the processes of interaction with which 
he dealt before arriving at his formulations. This is not to suggest 
that the carefully reasoned recommendations of a distinguished legal 
scholar of international reputation are not entitled to earnest considera-
tion, nor that we are entitled to presume that Jenks, a lawyer with 
more than thirty-three years of acquaintance with international organ-
izations, did not rely heavily upon his vast experience with interna-
tional decision-making and his understanding of global conditions, in-
cluding the predispositions of the decision-makers themselves, in de-
veloping his proposals. Indeed, it is the disordered state of these con-
ditions which provided the impetus for his writing. Rather, it is to 
suggest that his unwillingness to consider systematically the ways in 
which all of the relevant features of the world community bear upon 
the process of decision has seriously limited the feasibility of his recom-
mendations. This is especially true with respect to situations of high 
value intensity,S the very situations which Jenks believes must be 
subjected to authoritative control by international law.9 
8 Jenks is somewhat disdainful of legal scholarship in international law which does 
not motivate action. (Ibid., II.) 
7 See, e.g., Florentino P. Feliciano, book review, Yale Law Journal, LXVIII (April 
1959); and Falk and Mendlovitz, "Some Criticisms." 
S By "high value intensity" I simply refer to situations in which the participants tend 
jealously to guard their interests, their values, and their freedom of action. Arms 
control, disarmament, and the status of West Berlin are classic examples. However, 
any situation in which important resources or institutions are sought to be subjected 
to international control or agreement can become of high value intensity once a re-
lationship to cold war politics becomes publicized. 
9 E.g., ''The primary function of international law in the contemporary world is to 
outlaw recourse to armed force" (p. 53). 
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For example, his proposal for the development of a universally ap-
plicable body of rules through comparative study and synthesis of 
diverse legal systems (chap. VII) fails to take into adequate account 
the complementarity of legal doctrines which provides a choice to 
decision-makers to select among competing rules based on value pref-
erences and policy.10 The supposition that such universality will 
promote submission to international adjudication ignores the his-
torical datum that states wedded to the civilization and culture out of 
which modern international law has sprung have at times refused to 
commit themselves unconditionally to the jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice.11 It also pays insufficient attention to the major 
reason for such refusals: deeply rooted adherence to concepts of sov-
ereignty and independence which provide protection, or which na-
tional decision-makers believe provide protection, from external control 
and manipulation of highly esteemed interests and values of the do-
mestic society. In short, the proposal for universality, in which Jenks 
calls for a massive research effort and a heavy commitment of resources 
and scholarship to the study of comparative law, seriously overem-
phasizes the value of rules over the rule of values.12 
Jenks's view that interdependence has replaced dependence as a basic 
concept, that there is a common morality upon which international 
law can be based, and that the collective will of the world community 
is the emerging basis of obligation in international law, while en-
nobling, are unfortunately subject to similar criticism. It is curious 
that in seeking support for the last proposition Jenks turns to psychol-
10 The complementarity of legal rules and their "normative ambiguity" are discussed 
in McDougal and Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order. 
11 The most notorious example is the Connally reservation. Declaration by the Pres-
ident of the United States of America, August 14, 1946, Respecting Recognition by 
the United States of America of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice, para. z(b), 61 Stat. 1Z18, T.I.A.S. No. 1598. 
12 The criticism is not that Jenks fails to recognize the effect of national interests 
of a non-legal nature on the acceptance of international law, for he states: "National 
attitudes toward questions of public international law have frequently been, and con-
tinue to be, influenced by national conceptions of public policy which have generally 
had more of the flavour of interests than of that of legal conceptions" (p. I4z). Rather, 
it concerns his failure, in recommending research toward a synthesis of legal tra-
ditions, to give sufficient weight to this factor. 
Professor Carlston, on the other hand, is fully cognizant of the impact of national 
policies and values. He states, as essential propositions: "The orientation of a state 
official toward a rule of international law as a factor in his decision making will be 
to take action at the outer limits of rationality in the application of the rule when it 
conflicts with national policy and values" (p. 165). And, "Decision making in the 
international system is predominantly made by those in authoritative roles who view 
situations of an international character in the light of their respective national cultures, 
value systems, and goals" (p. 141). 
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ogy and the "sociology of politics" (p. 94),13 whereas he scrupulously 
avoids interdisciplinary consultation in placing his own recommenda-
tions for action within the framework of global processes of decision. 
What is being criticized here, of course, is not his classical erudition, but 
rather his failure to come to grips with the discouraging but nonethe-
less vital fact that a multitude of factors-political, economic, soci-
ological, ideological, and psychological-coupled with serious diver-
gences of value goals and premises and further exacerbated by dis-
torted images of world affairs on the part of the power elites of nation-
states, account for the continued reluctance to submit major issues 
of peace, freedom, and welfare to authoritative and effective decision-
making on a global scale. Thus, his emphasis on the importance of 
formulating moral and philosophical bases for new prescriptions is 
largely misplaced, reflecting a dangerously oversimplified perception 
of why international adjudication and legislation have been ineffec-
tive.u 
As compared with Jenks, Kenneth Carlston, in Law and Organiza-
tion in World Society, exhibits far greater willingness to contend with 
the realities of international life. Two major differences are evident. 
First, Carlston displays the skepticism of the American legal realist 
regarding the role which legal rules play in international decision-
making, recognizing that policy with respect to value objectives is 
ordinarily the decisive factor (p. X).15 Like Jenks, he believes that 
perspectives of universality are important to the advancement of law 
and organization in the world community, but his conception of 
universality emphasizes the need to identify and then develop practices 
and institutions designed to maximize universally shared values, not 
just to synthesize and discover universally shared legal norms. Second-
ly, his research and his theory rely heavily upon the collected wisdom 
13 Specifically, he refers to Walter Lippmann, The Phantom Public (New York 1925). 
14 The relative ineffectiveness of finding a moral basis of obligation as a means of 
explaining conformity or non-conforrnity to international law has been asserted by 
Professors McDougal and Feliciano: "Amorphous, transcendental notions of an 'in-
herent binding force' and 'basis of obligation' may be useful in the exhortation of 
the conscience of peoples. Propositions cast in the solemn terms of 'binding obligation' 
probably do in measure commit and engage peoples' consciences. The suggestion we 
make, however, is that the clarification of fundamental policy and the explicit relating 
of specific alternatives in decision to the basic demands, expectations, and identifica-
tions of peoples constitute, again because of the postulate of maximization, much the 
more effective way of organizing, channeling, and harnessing their perspectives to 
the implementation of minimum order and as well of international law generally" 
(p. 278). 
13 Professor Carlston has had better than thirty years of experience in the practice 
and teaching of international law. 
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of disciplines other than law, frequently drawing support from studies 
of political scientists, economists, sociologists, and others. 
For these reasons alone, one is entitled to expect a less romantic 
perception of the province and function of law in global relations 
from Carlston than from Jenks. This expectation is heightened by the 
fact, made explicit in Carlston's foreword (p. vii), that he is adopting 
a scientific approach to his inquiry, wherein a specific problem, a 
microcosm of global conflict, will serve first as a seeding ground for 
the author's theory of law and organization in world society, and then 
as a laboratory for testing some of the propositions which compose 
his theory. 
As his core problem Carlston selected the nationalization of con-
cession agreements. The features of this problem were then explored, 
not solely for the purpose of analyzing the legal doctrine which regu-
lates the problem, but in order to determine "its factual aspects and 
ramifications, the values and perceptions of the actors involved, the 
nature of its social, economic, and political setting, and the function 
and ends which the relevant rules of law should serve"(p. 8). 
Unfortunately, the failure to adopt a more systematic approach to 
the factual features of the problem detracts somewhat from the ful-
fillment of Carlston's objective.16 Nonetheless, he draws a vivid picture 
of the important role of the concession agreement in serving the needs 
of the economies of both the industrially developed and the developing 
states and of the international, as well as the national, role which such 
agreements play. His examination of the economic implications of 
trade relationships between the have and have-not states and interna-
tional commodity problems underlines not only the factual inter-
dependence of states but the phenomenon that interdependence, when 
it works unfavorably toward the developing nations, as it has since the 
Second World War, is a cause of frustration which often results in 
resort to nationalization and unrealistic demands for autarky. His per-
ception of the fact that interstate symbiosis is not necessarily a basis for 
"international solidarity or integration," but can become so only in con-
junction with the simultaneous realization of valued goals (p. 99), 
16 A more systematic methodology, which would have ensured that no relevant 
stone was left unturned, has been developed by Professors McDougal and Lasswell 
of the Yale Law School and applied, with variations, by a number of contemporary 
legal scholars. Briefly, it requires examination of all participants, their value objec-
tives, the situations in which they are functioning, their base values, their strategies, 
the specific outcomes of the process, and the longer-term effects on the participants, 
their values, and the various communities which are affected. See Myres S. McDougal, 
"Some Basic Theoretical Concepts About International Law: A Policy-Oriented Frame-
work of Inquiry," Journal of Conflict Resolution, IV (September 1960), 337. 
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points out the fallacy in Jenks's approach to interdependence as a 
basic concept of international law replacing that of dependence. For, 
in the current state of international relations, it appears to be the chaf~ 
ing of the developing nations at the ill effects of their factual depend~ 
ence upon the industrialized nations which has contributed to their as~ 
sertions of rights of legal independence and sovereignty. 
Turning from economics to examination of the societal structures 
of states engaged in nationalization, Carlston hypothesizes, and then 
seeks to prove, that such structures exhibit consistent patterns. He re~ 
fers to such states as "veneer states," which fail to exhibit in all their 
cultural patterns the characteristics of more highly developed societies, 
but contain a large population segment that does not share widely in 
the realization of important values monopolized by the elite (chap. 
IV). The lesson which Carlston draws from this part of the study, and 
indeed the major thesis of his book, is that submission to the authority 
of law and the creation of a stable world organization are predicated 
upon the requirement that "law ... should secure the conditions neces~ 
sary for effective interaction in the system with a view to realizing 
commonly shared values by the actors, as well as adherence to ideal 
and valued norms of behavior" (p. 285). 
Having examined the factual and historical patterns of nationaliza~ 
tion, its causes, and its effects on international economic relations, 
Carlston then proceeds (after first expounding upon the detailed 
propositions which compose his theory of law and organization) to 
an examination of the juridical aspects of nationalization. The tech~ 
nique adopted is to state and examine the technical legal doctrine as 
it has been applied and manipulated by various decision~making bodies 
and then to find a norm. That norm's validity is tested by determining 
the extent to which it affects the realization of values shared by the 
actors who are to submit themselves to such norms and, in addition, 
the extent to which it meets other criteria of authoritativeness and 
effectiveness prescribed by the author in his theory of the province 
and function of law. He draws the conclusion that 
The international law norm governing a premature termination by a 
state of a concession agreement with an alien effected by an act of nation~ 
alization is that such action will entail international responsibility to the 
state of which the alien is a national to make prompt, adequate, and 
effective compensation. 
The above legal norm represents an ideal and valued norm of behavior 
by virtue of the fact that it embodies an acceptable composite or adjust~ 
ment of the values involved in the situations to which the norm is ap-
plicable (pp. 283-84). 
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The sections of the author's work described above,17 which deal 
explicitly with the various contextual and juridical features of na-
tionalization of concession agreements, are deemed by Carlston to "il-
lustrate the functional manner in which international legal questions 
should be investigated and stated" (p. ix). 
The remainder of the book contains Carlston's elaborate theoretical 
formulation of the organizational structure of world society and the 
province and function of law within that society. Through a series of 
interdependent propositions and recommendations, drawing heavily 
on the work of behaviorists and social scientists as well as on his own 
earlier work,t8 he develops the thesis that successful world organiza-
tion and the advancement of law and authority in international rela-
tions will depend greatly on the extent to which the organization and 
the law tend to maximize the realization of values shared by the 
participants at all cultural levels. 
Depending, as it does, both on "empirical observation of human 
behavior" reported by the behavioral sciences and on a realistic view 
of jurisprudence, Carlston's value-oriented theory represents a sub-
stantial contribution to the understanding of the basic postulates of 
world public order. In many ways, Carlston has explicitly taken into 
account those vital factors the importance of which Jenks has only 
dimly perceived.19 
It is the writer's view, however, that the merit of both works must 
ultimately be judged by the extent to which their conclusions and 
recommendations are the product of a realistic conception of all of the 
relevant features of the process of decision in the world society, and by 
the degree to which they convincingly orient the reader toward such 
reality. Traditional patterns of global interaction, which as a result 
of technological advance have become suicidal, cannot be altered if 
17 I.e., chaps. I-IV and propositions 9 and 10 of chap. VII. 
18 Law and Structures of Social Action (New York 1956). 
19 It would not do Jenks justice to suggest that his enthrallment with doctrine en-
tirely excludes concern for underlying policy. Thus, the common law of mankind 
toward which he directs his effort is seen as a body of law which will advance the 
widely shared values of "human dignity, economic stability and growth, and the 
enlistment of technological change in the service of man" (p. 57). Furthermore, his 
concept of universality is unquestionably premised on the view that submission to 
supranational authority by emerging states is dependent upon the degree to which 
the norms applied by such authority incorporate values shared by such states. In 
his lecture, "The Challenge of Universality," for example, he grudgingly agreed with 
Professor McDougal that "the effective authority of any legal system depends in the 
long run upon the underlying common interests of the participants in the system" 
(p. 148). It is, however, his response to the foregoing that is disappointing; he calls 
merely for "a rigorous analysis of the concepts being compared" as "the first step 
towards any synthesis [of legal doctrine] of real value" (ibid., italics added). 
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those guiding the action do not perceive the changes of conditions 
which require a changed response. This perception, in turn, must be at 
a high level of consciousness, and must be accompanied by an equally 
conscious recognition of the immediate and consequential effects of 
such changes, both actual and potential, on the value structure of the 
decision-maker himself and those for whose well-being he is respon-
sible. 
While the scope of this article does not permit a restatement of the 
work of the few distinguished legal scholar-scientists who are working 
feverishly against time to develop a creative role for law within the 
framework of the decentralized, partially polarized, world society, it 
may serve a useful purpose to rehearse here some of the global con-
ditions which must be taken into account in developing that role. 
(I) The decentralized, non-judicial nature of decision-making at 
the transnational level. Professor McDougal and others have pointed 
out that the global society is made up of diverse systems of order in 
which those who possess formal authority for making decisions that 
have the greatest impact on the entire society are usually officials of 
nation-states who also occupy the role of claimants on behalf of their 
own states.20 When such officials believe that particular claims bear 
heavily on the prominent values of their own state-whether such 
belief is justified or not-the effect of legal doctrine as a factor in 
decision-making becomes minimal, while considerations of policy be-
come decisive. As modern history clearly indicates, doctrine is often 
manipulated to justify policy ends/1 and as Carlston suggests, in the 
long run the norms are adhered to only to the extent that they assist, 
directly or indirectly, in the realization or preservation of desired 
values. 
But, and this is crucial, the fact that adherence to a particular norm 
(or to international law in general) will serve important value goals 
20 Cf. Myres S. McDougal and Associates, Studies in World Public Order (New 
Haven 1960), 276. 
21 This practice is evident in every phase of international legal relations from claims 
to exercise the right of self-defense, claims to exercise jurisdiction or competence over 
persons and resources, etc., up to claims relating to the basis of obligation and sources 
of international law. The writings of some of the Soviet legal theorists, for example, 
indicate the way in which the sources of international law can be manipulated to 
serve national policy. See, e.g., G. 1. Tunkin, "Remarks on the Juridical Nature of 
Customary Norms of International Law," California Law Review, XLIX (August 1961), 
419; and Tunkin, "Coexistence et Droit International," Hague Academy of International 
Law, Recueil des Caurs, xcv (1958), I. Incidentally, these articles also point up the 
almost insurmountable difficulty of getting the Soviet Union to accept, at a doctrinal 
level, Jenks's views that the will of the world community is replacing consent as a 
basis of obligation in international law or that interdependence is being substituted 
for independence as a basic international legal concept. 
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of the state will not result in its application by the official unless its 
relation to such goals is clearly perceived both by the official and by 
those participants in the process of decision who influence his action. 
(2) The effective, as distinguished from the formal, decision-makers 
within the various orders which compose the world community are 
widely dispersed. Depending upon the nature of the society involved, 
the official in whom formal decision-making authority reposes is con-
trolled and influenced to varying degrees by other participants-in-
dividuals and groups-both within and without his own society. In a 
pluralistic democratic society, the power and influence of such partic-
ipants are widely dispersed. Nonetheless, their perspectives, myths, and 
valued institutions exercise considerable influence upon decision-
making by those in formal authority.22 In a totalitarian society the 
dispersion of authority is not as great, but the formal decision-maker 
is still compelled to consider not only the demands and expectations 
of other members of the power elite within his own state, but external 
pressures as well, if he is to retain his power position. It follows, there-
fore, that before those officials with the formal authority to make 
decisions of international import can be expected to adhere to uni-
versally accepted norms, those who influence them must also be con-
vinced that adherence to such norms will maximize their own 
esteemed values, or at least not erode them. 
(3) The "reality gap." The failure of the states which comprise the 
world community to submit themselves to the application of universal 
norms applied by independent judicial organs, or to move at any-
thing more than snail's pace toward the creation of effective institu-
tions designed to control the unilateral resort to force, may thus be 
ascribed to a pervasive blindness to the dangers and opportunities of 
the modern world. Whatever the causes-and the social psychologists, 
sociologists, and even psychiatrists have contributed a great deal to 
our understanding of such causes23-there is a gap in reality of cata-
clysmic proportions between the popular myth-appropriate for a by-
gone era-that a powerful nation-state is the ideal vehicle for value 
22 Official statements to the contrary notwithstanding, it is interesting to speculate 
whether President Johnson'S decision of August 4, 1964, to retaliate against North 
Vietnamese bases for the torpedo boat attacks on United States destroyers would have 
been of the same intensity if his opponent in the next presidential election had not 
been urging greater bellicosity against the Communists. To what extent can decision-
makers, acting under the pressures of a demand for immediate decision in a situa-
tion of high crisis, exclude such factors from their consideration? 
23 See, e.g., Roger Fisher, ed., International Conflict and Behavioral Science: The 
Craigville Papers (New York 1964), and Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, 
Psychiatric Aspects of Prevention of Nuclear War (New York 1964). 
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protection (and creation) and the facts of the real world, which inex-
orably lead to the conclusion that organization and collective security 
present the only viable alternatives to total destruction and that trans-
national cooperation and mutual assistance are the best avenues to the 
solution of the world's economic and social problems.24 Thus, as the 
danger of nuclear war between the United States and the USSR has 
diminished slightly because of the deterrent effect of the balance of 
terror, the centrifugal forces of irresponsible nationalism have been 
released in every corner of the globe and grow apace as if the danger 
of nuclear war had disappeared entirely. As part of this development, 
the growth of the interdepender.ce of states-upon which Jenks based 
his new concept of interdependence-is retarded by demands for po-
litical and economic independence on behalf of practically all states. 
Even the paragon of regional economic cohesion, the European Com-
mon Market, displays growing signs of difficulty in both its political 
and economic aspects by virtue of reluctance to sacrifice national inter-
ests for the greater good of the entire region.25 
In this context, what McDougal and Feliciano have suggested, in 
discussing sanctioning processes in the world community, becomes of 
wider relevance: "The most immediately relevant tasks of scholars 
and others concerned for the establishment of inclusive sanctioning 
processes appropriate to a world public order of freedom, security and 
abundance would thus appear to lie, not so much in the invention and 
evaluation of specific new legal techniques, as in the design and ex-
ecution of appropriate alternatives in communication and collabora-
tion for promoting the necessary changes in the perspectives of the 
effective decision-makers of the world."26 International lawyers and 
legal scholars of the stature of Jenks and Carlston can bring skills and 
knowledge to these tasks far beyond mere talent for manipulating 
legal doctrine and theory. 
In the first place, they can reorient the perspectives of their audience. 
They can utilize their understanding of the realities of conditions in 
the world community, coupled with their influence and skills in com-
munication, to shatter the anachronistic illusions of the influential per-
24 Cf. J. W. Fulbright, Prospects for the West (Cambridge, Mass., 1963). 
25 Cf. P. H. Spaak's comment in European Community, LXXII (June 1964), 7: 
"Even if we leave aside the problems of Great Britain's possible entry into the Com-
mon Market, and the increasingly grave and important question of our relation with 
the United States, we must accept the fact that at present there is little chance of 
further progress towards political unity in Europe. The difference in approach is so 
great and so profound that it is difficult to conceive of anyone proposing a compromise, 
let alone accepting one. This is just not the time." 
26 McDougal and Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order, 375. 
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sons who make up their audience. This calls for a description of inter-
action in the world community which gives ample attention to such 
realities as the cold war, nuclear weaponry, major technological and 
scientific advances, the so-called "revolution of rising expectations," 
the "population explosion," the emergence of new states, the rise of 
socialism, demands for autarky, and especially the demands, expecta-
tions, and identifications of world decision-makers, and which at-
tempts to test the impact of these realities upon the trends of world 
decision-making. While Carlston has considered many of these factors 
in developing his thesis, Jenks has apparently found contemplation 
of most of them too depressing to warrant an examination of their 
impact upon the effectiveness of his proposals.27 
They can create an awareness of the impact of such realities upon 
the preservation, destruction, and production of values and, in turn, 
upon global decision-making processes. Although it is idle to suggest 
that the world's effective decision-makers are not aware, for example, 
of the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons, the extent to which 
there is full appreciation, at a high level of consciousness, of the de-
gree to which nuclear arms immediately threaten all values is open 
to question. So it is, to an even greater extent, with the potentialities 
inherent in the other mentioned conditions. Scholars of international 
law, therefore, can contribute much through their writing and per-
sonal influence toward fuller comprehension of the relationship 
among conditions, values, and decisions. What is especially required 
is the fullest exposition of the possibilities for the maximization of 
all values through modern science and technology, leading to wide-
spread recognition of the fact that the cold war and nationalism are 
primitive, inefficient, and dangerous instrumentalities for achieving 
value goals as compared with international organization, cooperation, 
and stable conditions of world order. Here of course, as in describing 
conditions, the legal scholar will have to rely heavily on the lore of 
other disciplines, but it is the characteristic of the great lawyer that 
27 Mr. Jenks recognizes that "on major questions of personal freedom, political 
organisation and economic policy, and above all on matters involving relative power 
and the strategy of self-protection and self-aggrandizement, there are cleavages of 
view which it would be idle to minimise" (p. 95). It seems to this reviewer, however, 
that he does minimize them when he adds: "These divisions within the world com-
munity inevitably limit and weaken the substantial content of its laws and make the 
continued existence of the community itself precarious, but they do not in themselves 
deprive it of its character of a community with a law derived from and supported 
by its common will." Or, "The problems which confront the world community, grave 
as they may be, do not impair its character as a community or the binding nature 
and potentially reasonably comprehensive ambit of its law" (pp. 95-96). 
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he can absorb and comprehend the non-legal technical aspects of the 
problem with which he deals. Had Jenks carefully examined the re-
lationship between world conditions and value maximization he might 
have discovered that his "common morality" could be made more ap-
pealing and ultimate! y more acceptable28 if based on realizable uni-
versally held aspirations for the good life, coupled with realistic fears of 
total value destruction, rather than merely being "the product of an en-
lightened self-interest which does to others as it would be done to 
primarily because an accepted code of conduct eliminates some of the 
uncertainty of life and makes it less 'nasty, brutish and short'" (p. 
66).29 
For Carlston, however, the success of organization and law depends 
upon the degree to which they provide a vehicle for the protection and 
realization of widely shared values. Unfortunately, in developing his 
study of nationalization he falls short of the suggested objective by 
reason of his failure to treat adequately such elements of his subject as 
investment guarantee insurance, the ability to pay adequate com-
pensation promptly and its economic effect on the developing nation, 
and the degree of tenacity with which perspectives leading to confisca-
tion are held.30 
Lastly, international legal scholars can develop realistic alternatives 
for decision-makers. There can be little doubt that harassed political 
leaders of the major power-wielding states are looking for, but not 
finding, courses of action which will enable them both to lessen in-
ternational tensions without sacrificing national interests and to get 
28 Jenks asserts that "we must seek a basis of obligation which will hold effectively 
the allegiance of mankind" (p. 88) and "a concept which has the simplicity, the 
authority and the dynamic quality necessary to establish the obligation of inter. 
national law in the hearts and minds of the people" (p. 89). 
29 The quoted phrase is deemed to be the basis of a "commercial morality" which is 
similar to "the morality necessary to sustain an effective system of international law" 
(ibid.). While it is no doubt true that the desire for certainty and order plays a 
large part in the development of universal norms of commercial law, the realizable 
hope for profit or, in the behaviorist's terms, the maximization postulate is probably 
the major factor. 
80 Careful examination of these factors might have led to a more realistic conclusion 
that the norm which uniformly requires "prompt, adequate and effective compensa-
tion," as those terms are generally defined by lawyers in developed countries, is not 
necessarily the norm best designed, in the current state of world conditions, to result 
in the widest realization of values. Compare Frank G. Dawson and Burns H. Weston, 
"Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino: New Wine in Old Bottles," University of 
Chicago Law Review, XXXI (Autumn 1963),63; and "Prompt, Adequate and Effective: 
A Universal Standard of Compensation?" Fordham Law Review, xxx (April 1962),727. 
A more comprehensive methodology for exploring difficult legal problems of con-
temporary importance is applied in McDougal, Lasswell, and Via sic, Law and Public 
Order in Space (New Haven 1963). 
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on with the business of economic and cultural development. In large 
measure, the failure of many of the current proposals to win their 
approval is attributable to the disorientation of the leaders themselves 
and those who influence them, as suggested above. This aspect of 
the problem will not yield to short-term solution; reorientation in 
perspectives of reality requires a committed elite working over a span 
of time with every available instrument of communication. In the 
meantime, however, there are opportunities for scholars to develop 
specific proposals of varying degrees of modesty for moving toward 
the goal of minimum order even within the framework of a "reality 
gap." For such proposals to succeed, they must not irritate the raw 
nerves of global conflict-the cold war, colonialism, intervention, ag-
gression-nor violate the current taboos of internal politics of the 
participating states-appeasement, loss of sovereignty, recidivism, etc.a1 
On the positive side, they must enhance some recognized value 
goal shared by the participants-some common interest-no matter 
how modest. The more effective proposals will fulfill widely shared 
and frequently articulated desires for rapprochement among cold 
war rivals, and will have as their objective the restoration of order or 
the advancement of scientific, technological, cultural, and economic 
goals. The major gains of the last few years, such as the Antarctic 
treaty, the nuclear test ban treaty, the mutual, voluntary limitation 
on the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and the sale of wheat to the 
USSR by the United States, have all exhibited these characteristics. 
It is in the area of techniques for developing such proposals that 
Jenks's broad experience as an international civil servant in the ILO 
yields up his most valuable theory. He recommends that in areas 
where broadly drawn agreements, such as the Draft Conventions on 
Human Rights, fail to secure wide adherence, a piecemeal approach 
can be more fruitful. Similarly, with respect to the growth of inter-
national organization, he recognizes the practical difficulty of devel-
oping the United Nations into a centralized organization along the 
a1 It does not matter much if the proposals actually do constitute intervention, in 
any of the senses in which that term has been used, or do entail a limitation of 
freedom of action (loss of sovereignty), etc., so long as this is not publicized and 
exploited to the point where the authoritative decision-maker is forced by political 
pressures to abandon them. Thus the way in which words, slogans, and symbols are 
manipulated becomes relevant. For example, chances for ratification by the United 
States of the consular treaty with the USSR will be improved if it is popularly treated 
as "a gain for democracy and the open society" rather than as a "strengthening of 
diplomatic ties between the United States and the Soviet Union." Unfortunately, 
the latter approach has already been inaugurated by opponents of the treaty. See 
New York Times, June 12, 1964. 
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lines of familiar national patterns, and recommends instead the de-
centralization of responsibility for the functions of international gov-
ernment along lines which have already appeared, toward "a new 
form of functional federalism" (p. 31). And Carlston, though less 
directly concerned with decentralization, has stated: "The task of estab-
lishing a viable international organization, in which authority is 
exercised as a means of coordinating action to maximize value realiza-
tion by the members of the organization, is one of establishing a set 
of conditions in which the members, as actors in the organization, 
will move fluidly through a sequence of situations in which they ac-
cept authority, at first minimally, with slight commitment of time, 
action, and resources, and low risk of value impairment, and there-
after, in successively larger commitments of time, action, and resources 
and higher risk of value impairment. Such a set of conditions involves 
planning a sequence of goals embodying a desired pattern of value 
realization" (p. lI5). . 
Both, therefore, seem to share a healthy skepticism about the pos-
sibility of attaining Utopian schemes of international organization 
overnight, and both seem to recognize the need for limiting goals to 
negotiable proportions.32 Yet techniques alone are not enough, and 
neither work contains specific proposals for meeting the most im-
mediate needs of the times-the inclusive sharing of force and the pre-
vention of escalation. Other legal scholars, however, have developed 
such proposals. Professors Falk and Mendlovitz, for example, have rec-
ommended "precautionary intervention" by the United Nations to 
resolve situations of social conflict existing within developing states 
while such situations are relatively depoliticized and remote from 
the paralyzing effects of the cold war.33 If their proposal gains ac-
ceptance and proves effective over time, its success will be mainly at-
tributable to the fact that they frankly faced up to the obstacles as 
well as to the benefits which could be expected. 
Finally, to mention an emerging possibility, the recent proposal of 
the USSR for the establishment of a standing international peace-
keeping force through the Security Council of the United NationsU 
may have within it the seeds of an acceptable plan for inclusive shar-
82 Their views seem to be in general accord with the sophisticated but practical tech-
nique of "fractionating conflict," recently developed by Professor Fisher. (Roger 
Fisher, "Fractionating Conflict," Daedalus [Summer 1964], 920.) He proposes that 
the scope of the issues submitted to international negotiations can be narrowed or 
broadened in order to enhance the possibility of agreement. 
8a Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz, "Towards a Warless World: One 
Legal Formula to Achieve Transition," Yale Law Journal, LXXIlI (January 1964), 399. 
34 See New York Times, July 5, 1964, IV; July 7, 1964. 
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP AND WORLD ORDER 493 
ing of force by all nations to prevent the growing demands of arrant 
nationalism from disrupting world order. It is suggested that this 
proposal may be more than a mere propaganda effort and, if so, may 
have a greater chance for successful implementation than has gen-
erally been recognized. While this article cannot serve as the vehicle 
for lengthy exposition of the reasoning in support of this view, it 
may be useful to point out that the proposal may be born not only 
out of dissatisfaction with the Uniting for Peace Resolutions and 
unwillingness to pay for earlier peace-keeping operations, but also out 
of a recognition by Soviet leaders that their own ability to manipulate 
and control global conflict to their own ends has declined substantially 
in a relative sense vis-a-vis the lesser powers as a result of the paralyzing 
effect of the balance of deterrent power, and that the danger of un-
controlled and undesired escalation has therefore increased substan-
tially.35 It is not unreasonable, therefore, to suggest that the Soviet 
Union may now be prepared to cooperate in the creation of an inter-
national force designed to prevent escalation in situations where its 
influence would otherwise prove ineffective to bring a conflict under 
control, as in Laos and Vietnam and possibly in Cyprus.se That such 
a force and its operation would be subject to the veto in the Security 
Council would not seem to undermine its effectiveness if the basic 
premise-that the use of such a force would serve Soviet policy-has 
any validity.57 It will be recalled that cooperation among major states 
based on mutual interests in preserving peace is what the framers of 
the United Nations had in mind in 1945. 
35 Cf. Grayson Kirk, 'World Perspectives, 1964," Foreign Affairs, XLIII (October 
1964), 1. Mr. Kirk suggests that, partly as a result of the nuclear "balance of frustra-
tion," the relative status of the United States and the USSR in the world has been 
declining. He takes support for his position from Senator Fulbright's statement in 
Old Myths and New Realities (New York 1964), 54: "By their acquisition of nuclear 
weapons the two great powers have destroyed the traditional advantages which size 
and resources had placed at their disposal." Other knowledgeable commentators have 
also noted this phenomenon. See, e.g., Joseph C. Harsch, "Changing Times at Berlin 
Wall," Christian Science Monitor, September 21, 1964; James Reston, "Saigon and 
U.S. Power," New York Times, August 31, 1964; and Edward Crankshaw, "East and 
West Enter a New Phase," New York Times Magazine, August 30, 1964. 
36 The establishing and financing of a United Nations peace force through the 
General Assembly, rather than the Security Council, might seem to be a simple 
solution, but the Soviet Union's recorded opposition, based on legal and political factors, 
is too well known to permit a reversal in the near future. Furthermore, it is probably 
true that exercise of the Security Council veto against peace-keeping operations, at 
least in situations in which the danger of escalation is not serious, will remain an 
important strategy of the Soviet Union. 
37 Cf. Roger Fisher, "Should We Veto the Troika?" New Republic, August 21, 
1961, II-14, reprinted in Legal and Political Problems of World Order, ed. by Saul H. 
Mendlovitz (New York 1962), 276. 
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It is the irony of this era that the effective decision-makers of the 
global community maintain the self-destructive perspectives of the 
lemming while available knowledge and resources bring near-Utopian 
goals of peace, human welfare, and dignity within reach. Much 
of the cause can be attributed to a "reality gap" of cosmic proportions. 
It is an important task of scholars, therefore, to discover and then to 
describe to all those who participate in decision-making in the global 
arena the real conditions of the world society and the relationship 
between these conditions and the values of human dignity. This is 
essentially a task of communication for the purpose of changing 
perspectives. It is far from hopeless; history has already proved that 
perspectives held by entire societies can be changed almost overnight, 
and the instruments of global communication have never been more 
effective than they are today. 
Then, building upon a foundation of reality, legal scholars can de-
velop programs, plans, and proposals which offer alternatives for 
decision-makers that not only promote the values of human dignity, 
but are tailored for acceptance under existing conditions. Most im-
mediately, the need is for specific proposals to bring the alarming re-
cent development of lesser-power irrationality, conflict, and resort to 
coercion within a system of international authority and effective 
control. 
The needs and possibilities of order and international organization 
to promote the advancement of human welfare on a global scale are 
perceived by both Carlston and Jenks. They do not suffer from the 
paralysis of parochialism or the pessimism of myopia. The merit of 
Jenks's work lies in its persuasiveness in urging international lawyers 
to enlist in the cause of an international law for human welfare and 
freedom and in its observations drawn from a rich experience. Its 
failures are the consequence of the tendency, perhaps natural in a 
lawyer steeped in the tradition of the common law, to elevate the 
importance of doctrine over the search for agreement on underlying 
policies. Kenneth Carlston, on the other hand, has given us a carefully 
drawn view of the role of law in world society which furnishes more 
than a little light in the search for global institutions to serve human 
dignity. 
